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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE EXTENDED TO LAW-
YERS IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.-Petitioner, a member of the New York
Bar, refused to testify or to produce financial records at a judicial inquiry
into his professional misconduct. The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court ordered petitioner disbarred. Its decision recognized the
petitioner's right against self-incrimination, but ruled that by asserting that
right the petitioner forfeited his privilege of remaining a member of the bar.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, that the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and extends its protection to lawyers in disciplinary pro-
ceedings as well as to other individuals. Spevack v. Klein, 87 S.Ct. 625
(1967).
THE PRIVILEGE TO REMAIN SILENT
The federal privilege' against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. 2 The purpose of the privilege is to protect a witness
from compulsory disclosure of criminal conduct. 3 The privilege may be
pleaded in any federal proceeding, whether civil or criminal, whenever
the witness feels that to testify would subject him to future criminal
prosecution. 4 If the privilege is invoked in a criminal prosecution, no
inferences of guilt may be drawn.5 However, civil cases traditionally
allow an inference that the evidence withheld would be unfavorable to
the party asserting the privilege.6
The 1964 Supreme Court decision in Malloy v. Hogan7 extended the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to state proceedings by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to that case, the right was
not available in state actions except where provided by state constitu-
tional provisions.8
'When used in reference to constitutional guarantees, the commonly used term ''privi-
lege'' is virtually synonymous with ''right.''
'U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... "
'Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684, 689-90 (1953).
4Ibid.; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221,
144 N.W. 266, 270-71 (1913); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944).
'Ikeda v. Curtis, supra note 3, at 690; Ratner, Consequences Of Exercising The
Privilege Against Self-Incrinination, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 472 (1957).
'United States v. One 1948 Plymouth Sedan, 87 F.Supp. 967 (D.N.D. 1950); 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 161 (Supp. 1959).
7378 U.S. 1 (1964).
'See Ratner, supra note 5, at 472 n.2; see, e.g. MONT. CONSr. art. III, § 18: "No
person shall be compelled to testify against himself . . . . " Some states varied the
privilege by permitting comment by the prosecution and the raising of inferences
from the exercise of the privilege in criminal cases. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 132, at
276-77 (1954). However, this practice was prohibited by Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 610-15 (1965).
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The right to remain silent may also be inferred from the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment.' This right is not absolute, however,
and is subject to limitation by judicial process, grand jury proceedings,
congressional investigations, and other proceedings involving the public
interest.10 Further, there seems to be no limitation upon the inferences
which may be drawn from its being invoked,1' provided that those infer-
ences are reasonable. 12 This First Amendment privilege of free speech
is protected in state actions by the Fourteenth Amendint.13 Prior to
Malloy v. Hogan,14 therefore, the right to remain silent in state proceed-
ings could be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court only with
reference to the First Amendment guarantee.
THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW
Traditionally, the practice of law has been considered a privilege
to be granted or withheld according" to regrulations establishedl byv ihe in-
dividual states. 15 Perhaps the most common requirement of the states is
that a member of the bar possess good moral character. 16 An evaluation
of a person's moral character and fitness to practice law is most likely to
occur during either admission or disbarment proceedings. The admission
proceeding determines whether the privilege to practice law is to be
granted; and the disbarment proceeding determines whether the privi-
lege is to be withdrawn. While the states may interpret their own con-
ditions for membership in state bar associations, the state courts may not
arbitrarily deny the applicant or the attorney the protection of the due
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
THE DUAL STATUS THEORY
There exists, therefore, on the one hand the special privilege to
practice law, and on the other, the right to remain silent. The Supreme
Court has considered a number of cases where these two "privileges"
have clashed during either admission or disbarment proceedings.' 8 In
these cases, the representatives of the state advocating denial of mem-
9U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . ."
"Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957).
"Ibid.
"If unreasonable inferences were drawn, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be violated.
"Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
'4Supra note 7.
"In re Goodrich, 98 N.E.2d 125, 128 (S.D. 1959).
"OBrown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests For Admission To The Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 480
n.1 (1953).
"7Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
"SThe problems within the scope of this article do not require any distinctions between
admission and disbarment proceedings beyond those indicated in the text. Both
factions in the present United States Supreme Court have stated that the same
basic principles apply in both proceedings. See generally both the majority and
[Vol. 28
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bership in the state bar did so on the "dual status" theory.19 Advocates
of this theory admit that the lawyer, in his status as a citizen, is entitled
to certain constitutional righs. However, they maintain that in his status
as a member of the bar, the lawyer has dedicated his life to the admin-
istration of justice as an officer of the court. The privilege of practicing
law carries with it the obligation to co-operate with the courts. There-
fore, they reason, any refusal to co-operate, such as invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination, is a violation of that special duty which war-
rants disciplinary action.
The Supreme Court first considered the "dual status" theory in two
1961 cases'0 dealing with refusals by two states to admit certain appli-
cants to their state bars. The denials of admission were based on the
theory that the applicants had violated their duty to co-operate by re-
fusing to answer certain questions posed by the bar committees. In re-
fusing to answer, the petitioners in these cases relied upon the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment. In affirming the states' actions, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment which extends free-
doma of speech to state actions does not prevent a state from refusing to
admit to its bar a person who refuses to provide unprivileged answers
to questions having substantial relevance to his qualifications. In both
cases the Court ruled that the petitioner's First Amendment rights were
outweighed by the governmental interests involved-namely, the state's
interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest
sense.
In both of these decisions, Justices Black, Douglas, Warren, and
Brennan dissented. In writing for the minority, Black took issue with
the majority's "balancing test" in connection with the First Amendment
guarantees. That approach, he warned, meant that the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and petition can be repressed whenever there is
sufficient governmental interest in so doing.
In a companion case, Cohen v. Hurley,2" the Supreme Court accepted
the "dual status" theory in a disbarment proceeding. In that case, a
dissenting opinions in both the instant case and Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117(1961). It is well to keep in mind, however, that one primary distinction does exist.
In an admission proceeding the burden of proof is on the applicant to show proper
qualifications. In a disbarment proceeding, the burden of showing that the attorney
has failed to maintain the proper qualifications is on his accuser. In re Wells, 174
Cal. 467, 163 Pac. 657 (1917); see also Note, 65 YALE L.J. 873 (1956).
"The term "dual status" seems to have been first applied in this context by the
New York Supreme Court in In re Ellis, 258 App. Div. 558, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800, rev'd
282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967 (1940).
'Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) ; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
The Konigsberg decision was a sequel to Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252(1957), in which the Supreme Court reversed the state's initial refusal of the
application. This reversal was on the grounds that despite the applicant's refusal
to testify, he had introduced sufficient additional evidence to make out a prima fade
case of good moral character. The first case did not consider the question of
whether the state could treat the applicant's refusal to testify as a ground for
exclusion because such refusal had thwarted a full investigation into his qualifica-
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New York court had ordered the petitioner disbarred for asserting his
state22 privilege against self-incrimination and thereby refusing to co-
operate with the court in its efforts to expose professional misconduct.23
The petitioner sought relief in the Supreme Court, charging that such
state activity violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The high court rejected this contention, holding that be-
cause of the special duty owed by an attorney to the courts, such re-
fusal to testify might properly furnish grounds for discipline.24
Again Justices Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan dissented. In
addition to reiterating the argument against the "balancing away" of
constitutional rights, the dissenters contended that the federal privilege
against self-incrimination extends to witnesses in state proceedings by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this view, a state may not
penalize-in this case disbar-any person for invoking his constitutional
privilege. The dissenters agreed that this privilege belongs to all citi-
zens, and may not be withheld because a person has chosen to dedicate
his life to the legal profession. However, the rule of the majority was
that the status of an attorney, as an officer of the court, demanded that
he forfeit some of the guarantees provided by the Constitution lest he
suffer disciplinary action.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
Although the Supreme Court has been called upon to decide only a
few cases concerning use of the right to silence by lawyers, the unique
position of a lawyer as an officer of the court has led the courts to draw
an analogy between the lawyer and public employees. To understand
the entire rationale behind the present state of the law, it is necessary to
review the series of decisions involving public employees being dis-
ciplined for use of the right to remain silent under various circumstances.
The first important case- in this series was the 1956 decision in
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education25 The petitioner in this case was
a New York college teacher who had been discharged for invoking the
Fifth Amendment before a legislative committee. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the state had the right to consider assertion of the
privilege as equivalent to resignation. The United States Supreme Court
2'N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ..."
'For the series of cases developing the "dual status" theory in New York courts, see
In re Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907); In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116
N.E. 782 (1917) ; In re Becker, 229 App. Div. 62, 241 N.Y. Supp. 369 (1930) ; In re
Schneidkraut, 231 App. Div. 109, 246 N.Y. Supp. 505 (1930); In re Levy, 255 N.Y.
223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931); In re Ellis, supra note 19; In re Grae, 258 App. Div. 576,
17 N.Y.S.2d 822, rev'd 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940); In re Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d
488, 166 N.E.2d 672, aff'd, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).241n approving the principles advanced by the majority opinions of the Konigsberg and
Anastaplo cases, supra note 20, the Cohen court stated: 'The fact that such refusal
was here made a ground for disbarment, rather than for denial of admission to the
bar, as in Konigsberg and Anastaplo, is not of constitutional moment." Cohen v.
Hurley, supra note 18, at 123.
-350 U.S. 551 (1956).
[Vol. 28
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reversed this decision, holding that due process had been violated since
the dismissal had been predicated entirely upon events occurring before
a federal committee whose inquiry was not directed toward determining
petitioner's fitness for his particular job. Thus the Court made the "type
of inquiry" the deciding factor, and implied that if the petitioner had
invoked the privilege at an inquiry designed to ascertain his fitness to
continue teaching, with questions relevant to that issue, the outcome
might have been different.
26
Two years later the Supreme Court ruled in two more cases con-
cerning public employees. Beilan v. Board of Education27 involved an-
other school teacher, but this time the refusal to answer was made to
questions posed by the school superintendent in an investigation into
petitioner's fitness and suitability to teach. This lack of candor was
deemed "insubordination" and "incompetency" by the school board, suf-
ficient to sustain his discharge.28 The Supreme Court held that the rele-
vancy of the questions posed by the superintendent with a specific in-
tent to investigate the petitioner's qualifications raised a duty on the
part of the petitioner to answer. Thus, the Court affirmed the "type of
inquiry" distinction suggested in Slochower,29 and coupled with it a
theory that, as a public school teacher, the petitioner had certain obliga-
tions to co-operate with his employer.
In Lerner v. Casey,30 a New York subway conductor had been dis-
charged for refusal to answer questions put to him by his employer con-
cerning his membership in the Communist Party.3 1 In affirming this
action, the Supreme Court emphasized that the questions were asked by
a representative of the state conducting an inquiry into the fitness of its
employee. Again the court affirmed the "type of inquiry" distinction.
The Beilan and Lerner cases prompted dissents by Justices Black,
Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. While Warren disagreed on factual
grounds, 32 Black joined Douglas in protesting that the principles of de-
0Id. at 558-59.
-357 U.S. 399 (1958).
nThe petitioner was discharged under the terms of New York City Charter § 903 which
provides:
If any . . . employee of the city shall, after lawful notice or process, . . .
refuse to testify or answer any questions regarding. . . official conduct
of any officer or employee of the city. . . on the ground that his answer
would tend to incriminate him, . . . his term or tenure of office or employ-
ment shall terminate ...
Supra note 25.
-357 U.S. 468 (1958).
"
1The New York Security Risk Law (1951) specified certain state agencies as "security
agencies." Employees of such designated agencies were subject to dismissal if
reasonable evidence was found to exist causing doubt as to their trustworthiness and
reliability. See generally Laws N.Y. 1951, c. 233 as amended, Laws N.Y. 1954, C.
105.
8 Mr. Justice Warren felt that the basis for Beilan's dismissal was other than that
stated by the court. Namely, his refusal to testify before the House Sub-Committee
on Un-American Activities. Under this view Warren felt that the decision in





Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1966
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
mocracy allow no inference of wrongdoing to flow from the assertion of
any constitutional right.33
A shift in the position of the majority was evident when the Court
was called upon to rule in Nelson v. County of Los Angeles.3 4 In this case
a county employee had been dismissed for refusal to testify before a sub-
committee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. In affirm-
ing dismissal, the Supreme Court seemed to abandon the "type of in-
quiry" doctrine, and found support for its decision in the special duty
created for public employees by statute.3 5 The individual's right to re-
main silent was found to be subordinate to the state's legitimate interest
in securing information.
Again the reasoning of the majority failed to convince Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan. "6 In dissenting, Brennan sought to return
to the "type of inquiry" test, and on that basis felt that Slochower3 7 con-
trolled. Black again insisted that constitutional guarantees applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment are not subject to modifica-
tion by state statute or practice, regardless of the persons involved.
At this point the Supreme Court had arrived at parallel conclusions
in the areas of public employees and lawyers. Both were subject to the
"dual status" theory by virtue of the nature of their chosen profession.
While as citizens they were entitled to all the guarantees of the Consti-
tution, as public servants or officers of the court, they had taken on
special duties and obligations which were held paramount to their con-
stitutional rights.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The consistent agreement of the dissenters in cases involving both
lawyers and public employees gave warning of things to come. With the
arrival of Mr. Justice Goldberg on the bench 3 Justices Black and his
associates3 9 found a supporter of their view of the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, in Malloy v. Hogan,40 Goldberg joined Black, Douglas, Warren and
Brennan in forming a new majority which overruled an entire series of
cases ,41 and held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
Mr. Justice Brennan insisted that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof
as required in this type of case. Beilan v. Board of Education, supra note 27, at 417.
-'362 U.S. 1 (1960).
nCAL. Gov'T CODE § 1028.1 provides: "It shall be the duty of any public employee who
may be subpoenaed or ordered by. . . a duly authorized committee of the Congress
of the United States. . . to appear. . . and to answer under oath a question or
questions ....
aMr. Justice Warren did not take part in the decision.
3 Supra note 25.
160n October 1, 1962, Mr. Justice Goldberg succeeded the retiring Felix Frankfurter.
'Justices Douglas, Warren, and Brennan.
4 Supra note 7.
"Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); Knapp v. Schweitzer,
357 U.S. 371 (1958).
[Vol. 28
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ination is a basic right which is extended to a witness in a state court by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
When next the Court was called upon to rule in the area of public
employees and lawyers invoking the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Goldberg was
no longer a member of the Court.42 In his stead came Mr. Justice Fortas,
who chose to vote with Justices Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan in
the most recent cases.
In Garrity v. State of New Jersey,43 the Supreme Court was asked
to confirm the conviction of police officers who had been found guilty
of conspiracy to obstruct justice. The convictions were based upon con-
fessions made by the petitioners after they were given the choice of
either incriminating themselves or being discharged from their jobs under
a New Jersey statute which compelled the dismissal of public employees
who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. 44 The Court re-
versed the convictions, holding that "policemen, like teachers and law-
yers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights. '45 The majority opinion 46 declared that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is one to which all citizens are entitled, without threat of pun-
ishment being inflicted for its use. The threat of loss of employment was
considered sufficient "coercion" to make the confessions involuntary, and
inadmissible under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision in the Spevack47 case immediately followed the Garrity
decision, and relied upon many of the same principles. In this 5 - 4 de-
cision,48 Mr. Justice Douglas, in writing for the majority, recognized
that Malloy v. Hogan49 had raised questions concerning the validity of the
position taken by Cohen v. Hurley.50 Since the issues raised by Spevack
were indistinguishable from those in Cohen, the Court was faced with
either continuing the doctrine of the earlier case, or taking the position
advanced by the dissents in Cohen. The Court chose the latter, concluding
that Cohen v. Hlurley should be overruled, that the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment had been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it
extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and
that it should not be diluted by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
"Mr. Justice Goldberg resigned from the bench in July, 1965 and was replaced by Mr.
Justice Fortas in October, 1965.
"-87 S. Ct. 616 (1967).
44N.J. REV. STAT. § 2 A: 81-17.1 (Supp. 1965):
Any person holding... appointive public office, position or employment...
who refuses to testify upon matters relating to the office, position or
employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is the defendant...
shall be removed therefrom or shall thereby forfeit his office, position or
employment ...
"Garrity v. State of New Jersey, supra note 43, at 620.
"Written by Mr. Justice Douglas.
7Instant case.
"Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White dissented. These same four had dissented
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and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. 51 Hence-
forth, a person invoking his right to remain silent shall not suffer any
sanction which makes assertion of that right "costly."
5 2
CONCLUSION
Although the position taken by the new majority of the Court is
clear, perhaps it would be unwise to presume that such sweeping state-
ments will control future decisions in this area. Justices Black, Douglas,
Warren, and Brennan have advocated a consistent philosophy through-
out; and the majority-turned-minority represented by Harlan, Clark,
Stewart, and White seem equally set in their views. The future appears
to be in the hands of the newest member of the bench, Mr. Justice Fortas.
In this regard it is interesting to note that in the Spevack decision, al-
though Fortas voted for reversal, his specially concurring opinion53
reveals that he does not agree with the broad statements of the majority
opinion. The point of his distinction is that the lawyer's right to remain
silent is different from "that of a public employee who is asked ques-
tions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of
his official duties. '5 4 Thus, while rejecting any "dual status" theory
arising out of the nature of the lawyer's position as an officer of the
court, he would apparently accept such a theory, coupled with the "type
of inquiry" test adopted by the Slochower,55 Beilan,5 6 and Lerner57 de-
cisions, in cases where public employees are concerned. If the policemen
in the Garrity5 s case had maintained their silence, and been discharged for
it, Mr. Justice Fortas would have upheld those dismissals. It was only
the fact that the "coerced" confessions were later used in criminal prose-
cutions that compelled Justice Fortas to vote for the majority.5 9
With the opinions of the Court members so delicately balanced, any
prediction of the result of future litigation in this area should be done
with special awareness of the factual distinctions which have been made
by the individual justices in the past.
LAWRENCE F. DALY.
"'Instant case at 630.
52Instant case at 628, citing Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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